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For these reasons, it is not surprising that some of the most visible CEOs in America serve on the boards of other large corporations. For example, James Mulva (CEO of ConocoPhillips) is on the board of General Electric, Patricia Woertz (CEO of Archer Daniels Midland) is on the board of Procter & Gamble, and David Cote (CEO of Honeywell) is on the board of JPMorgan Chase. Interviews with senior-level executives indicate that they gain considerable insights from board experience that benefit their own organizations as well.
However, over the last ten years, the number of active CEOs serving as directors has declined in a precipitous fashion. According to Spencer Stuart, active CEOs represented over half (53 percent) of the pool of newly elected independent directors among S&P 500 companies in 2000. By 2010, that percentage fell to 26 percent. Active CEOs now sit on an average of 0.6 outside boards, down from 1.4 a decade ago. Corporate guidelines that limit outside directorships have no doubt contributed to this reduction. Almost two-thirds of companies limit the number of outside board seats that their CEOs may serve on, a policy not widely in effect a decade ago.
2 Increased time demands-both from directorship and from being a CEO-also likely encourage CEOs to voluntarily limit outside board service. Companies have responded to this trend by recruiting new directors who are executives below the CEO level or who are retired CEOs (see Exhibit 1).
It is unclear whether the change in professional composition of corporate boards represents a reduction in board quality or an improvement. Currently, there is no widely accepted, rigorous study that demonstrates that current CEOs are better board members or that companies with CEO directors benefit in terms of improved advice or monitoring. In fact, recent survey evidence suggests that active CEOs might not always be the best board members. According to a study by Heidrick & Struggles and the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, 80 percent of corporate directors believe that active CEOs are no better than non-CEO board members (see Exhibit 2). Although respondents value the strategic and operating expertise of CEO directors, when asked about their unattractive attributes, a full 87 percent state that active CEOs are too busy with their own companies to be effective.
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To be sure, survey respondents identified several positive aspects of having active CEOs serve on the board. Beyond their strategic and managerial expertise, respondents value active CEOs for their experiences in dealing with a crisis or failure and for their extensive personal and professional networks. In terms of intangible attributes, active-CEO directors were seen as being able to identify with the CEO on a range of pressing issues, build trust with the CEO, prioritize challenges, and demonstrate current knowledge of business issues.
On the other hand, active CEOs are criticized for not being as engaged as the company needs them to be and for being unable to serve on timeconsuming committees or participate in meetings called on short notice. Respondents also find fault with active CEOs for being too bossy, poor collaborators, and for not being good listeners.
The tenuous benefit of appointing active CEOs as directors is reflected in part in the research literature. Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) find no evidence that the appointment of an outside CEO contributes positively to future operating performance, decision making, or the monitoring of management by the board. 4 At the same time, the research suggests that the appointment of active CEOs as directors might lead to increased CEO compensation. O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) find a strong association between CEO compensation levels and the compensation level of the outside directors who serve on the board, particularly the compensation committee. They argue that, consistent with social comparison theory, committee members refer in part to their own compensation levels when approving CEO pay packages. If committee members are current CEOs with high compensation levels, this can lead to a distorted view of "fair market value" and a propensity to approve large compensation packages. 5 The Heidrick & Struggles and Stanford Rock Center survey cited above also found criticism of current CEOs for being "too generous with compensation."
For these reasons, it might be that the trend of recruiting fewer active CEOs and more retired CEOs as directors is beneficial to governance quality. After all, retired CEOs have the same strategic, operating, and leadership experience as current CEOs but without the time demands that distract them from their director duties. There is also common consensus that their leadership experience provides value well beyond their retirement date. 
